1. Introduction

“The New Leviathans” is a book by John Gray. It is not an easy read. It is overwritten and despite its short length it is too long, taking frequent digressions: so much so in fact it may be two books mashed into one or repurposed. But it does introduce the concept of “hyperliberalism”: a theoretical framework that unites “woke” and identity politics and academic liberalism under an umbrella term and provides a history. So let’s have a look.

2. Hobbes and Leviathans

The philosopher Thomas Hobbes published the book “Leviathan” in 1651. In Hobbes’ philosophy a Leviathan is an absolute ruler required to prevent a “State of Nature”. A state of nature is the technical term for a war of all against all, which is what you get if there is no strong central authority with a monopoly of violence. In Gray’s new book he discusses liberalism, hyperliberalism and the new Leviathans of the 21st century.

3. The origins of hyperliberalism

Gray lays down the following timeline. Protestant Christianity was taken by John Locke, who derived liberalism from it. Classical liberals then evolved liberalism further by introducing “faith in reason”. John Stuart Mill then disconnected liberalism from religion entirely by replacing God with humanity, and then hyperliberals refined it further by introducing the concept of self-created identity. So hyperliberalism is a version of liberalism with self-created identity added.

In short, all these states – Locke liberalism, classic liberalism, Mill liberalism and hyperliberalism – are derived from Christian monotheism and consequently underpinned by four principles, which for the purposes of this review I will refer to as “pillars”.  Those four pillars are

• Individualism: each person is important and can chart their own lives (the hyperliberalism version has “create their own identity” or similar)
• Egalitarianism: each person is equal
• Universalism: liberalism can be applied everywhere and everywhen
• Meliorism: institutions are indefinitely improvable

Gray contends that those “pillars” fail over time, with the more-modified hyperliberal ones failing first. Morality is not a constant so egalitarianism and universalism don’t last, the definition of “improvement” is not constant so meliorism doesn’t last, and individual rights conflict with collective ones.  I think he’s right but that prompts the question: why did hyperliberalism last as long as it did?

4. The utility of hyperliberalism

The answer is simple: ideas are tools not facts, useless ideas are discredited even when true, and useful ones are retained even when false. Hyperliberalism has utility. It provides a rationale for failing capitalism. It soaks up surplus elites (yes, he explicitly drags in Turchin) by providing employment for academics in hyperliberal watchdogs who might otherwise have to get a proper job that requires learning and effort. It provides the pleasures of persecution as heretics are sought and rejected. And by identifying and allowing disparate self-created identities, it creates identity politics, a political coalition between those new identities that can be used as a power base. So hyperliberalism is useful.

But if it is useful, why is it failing?

5. The problems of hyperliberalism

Christianity copes with change by accepting multitudes: provided you acknowledge Christ and act accordingly, you’re in regardless of past sin. Gray contends that classical liberalism also pulls off a similar trick by toleration, agreeing to disagree. But hyperliberalism cannot do this because heretics must be cast out to preserve its alliance, which is a problem because that’s unpleasant and nonviable long-term. In fact, that’s the underlying problem: the four pillars that underpin hyperliberalism and its predecessor liberalisms cannot cope with changes in morality and the passage of time. Attempts to maintain those four pillars such as universal monitoring or group-based rights work temporarily, but ultimately just make things worse. This is because rights and responsibilities are matters of politics and so must be resolved in the political sphere via modi vivendi, not matters of law resolvable in the legal sphere via judgements. Contested issues like abortion, gender, euthanasia, sexuality etc are not universals and eternals, so any settlement must be contingent and liable to change. Hyperliberalism cannot cope with this.

6. The future of hyperliberalism

After the Cold War it was thought that Leviathans had been made obsolete by liberal democracy, but as the four pillars fail, liberalism, hyperliberalism and liberal democracy are failing with them. As liberalism and hyperliberalism fail, they are being replaced by autocracies which can provide the same electoral appeal but can do so dynamically, adjusting to changes in public morality and interests in real time via social monitoring whilst designating victims to provide the pleasures of persecution. Whig progressivism cannot do this and Gray points out that neither Hayek’s principles nor Fukuyama’s end of history are eternal because people’s interests and principles are not eternal. There is no progressive ratchet, no end of history, and we cannot control the future.

7. Commentary

I adore John Gray but he has obvious problems and they are to the fore here. It’s not an easy read. He badly overwrites and the fifty-four pages of section two can be excised almost in toto: it feels like he ran out of time or material and threw in research for another book.

The book flits from concept to concept, making the logic difficult to extract. The word “pillars” is my invention and the more-modified hyperliberalism versions are clarifications introduced by me to try to make sense of the text. They are in there, but the text is clotted and repetitive: the bits about the four pillars are in page four and again in page 116 for example. It’s like picking out small fruit in a big cake, and there is a possibility I am imposing sense that just isn’t there.

The book also has some debatable assumptions. Gray believes classical liberalism was tolerant thru conviction, but I think classical liberalism was tolerant thru necessity, because 2020’s social monitoring wasn’t available then. To put it simply, heterodox opinions are easier to express if somebody isn’t posting them to Twitter within seconds. @rcs1000 insists that Gray’s stage three to stage four liberalism is nonsensical, because although Locke and Mill would recognize themselves as the same family, neither would have any sympathy for identity politics, regarding it as the anathema of liberalism.

But even with those weaknesses I contend this book is still useful. It is a stretch to conflate woke and hyperliberalism – the former being a local manifestation of the latter – but nevertheless hyperliberalism provides a sober explanation of woke’s rise, its history, its usefulness, and its fall, and also provides an umbrella term to unite woke, identity politics, and academic liberalism. Although other commentators trace woke to postmodernism or critical theory or the Frankfurt School, and Wikipedia traces it to AAVE, I think Gray’s theory is more consistent and rooted in history…well, ish. Plus any book that devotes four pages to HP Lovecraft can’t be all bad.

But oh dear God, it would have been better as a pamphlet.

8. Endpiece

This essay was written without AI help, and as it is a review of a book no sources are provided. “The New Leviathans” was written by John Gray and the version I reviewed was published by Allen Lane, Part of Penguin Random House, in 2023, ISBN number 978-0-241-55495-1. Support your local library.

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