In the space of a week we have heard two speeches which are changing the world we live in, certainly in Europe and, likely, elsewhere. This evening we will hear a third one.

The first was by Putin when announcing his invasion of Ukraine. The critical line is this one – “The problem is that in the territories adjacent to us – territories that were historically ours, I emphasise – an “anti-Russia” hostile to us is being created, placed under full external control; [it] is intensively settled by the armed forces of NATO countries and is supplied with the most modern weapons.”

“Territories that were historically ours“. Which territories might he mean? Ukraine, obviously. Belarus too. But also Poland, no? After all, from 1795 to 1918 a large part of it was seized and ruled by Russia, formally becoming a Russian province in 1867. There is more of course: the invasion of Poland in 1939, its annexation into Russia, the post-war incorporation of part of its territories into Western Ukraine and Belarus and its control by Moscow as a Warsaw Pact satellite. More than enough history there to justify an ownership claim. And Putin has a long-standing animus against Poland quite as bitter as that expressed against Ukraine. Read here how in December 2019 he was expressing hatred of Poland for starting WW2, how the Nazi-Soviet Pact was justified, how Poland was morally equivalent to the Nazis. Those verbal attacks echo the verbal attacks on Ukraine before this latest war, both in bitterness and content.

What of the Baltic states? Parts of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were also taken by the Russian Empire between 1795 and 1917 and then again at the end of WW2. Yet more history for Putin to emphasise. Then there are the other Warsaw Pact countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany. All of these fell within Russian control for nearly half a century. All of them now in NATO. Enough history for Putin to make a claim? Why not, if you are unscrupulous, willing to use the sorts of tactics against civilians used in Syria or Chechnya, unconcerned about committing war crimes, willing to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. After all, Putin said in April 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century“. Why wouldn’t he try to reverse this if he could? Sometimes when someone shows you who they are and what they want, it is best to believe them, rather than convince yourselves that they don’t really mean it, are just bluffing or it’s only aimed at a domestic audience.

Onto the second speech. Germany’s new Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, set out here his country’s new commitment to increase its military capabilities, increase its defence spending and enshrine these commitments in its Basic Law because it has understood that “Putin wants to build a Russian empire. He wants to fundamentally redefine the status quo within Europe in line with his own vision. And he has no qualms about using military force to do so.“

It is quite a change for Germany. It is quite a change for the EU. It is quite a change for Britain too. If Europe – collectively and within its constituent countries – decides to enhance and pay more for its own defence and sees this through (with consequent knock-on effects on what this means for other budgets), what will this mean for NATO capabilities and how it deals with an openly aggressive Russia? What will it mean for the US’s role in NATO? Will the US welcome this contribution or will it use it as a reason to withdraw further and concentrate more on its own hinterlands – the Pacific and China?

We may get a hint of this in the third speech – Biden’s State of the Union speech to Congress. Doubtless, there will be some reference to Ukrainian suffering. But Biden’s focus will be on the Union, his ratings, Democratic prospects in forthcoming elections, the cost of living for ordinary Americans etc. The US may, despite all its warm words and help behind the scenes, be too tired or bored or distracted to play the role it once did in saving Europe from itself or, indeed, from an angry Russia.

“Wars are like weddings. Essentially extravagant and unnecessary but a great stimulus in a convention-bound society.” This was written about Britain and its response to the 20th century’s two great wars. It may seem frivolous given the appalling suffering Ukrainians are experiencing now. But, given what Putin has now brutally clarified and the response of Germany and others, we are seeing old conventions and understandings being broken. We have yet to see what will replace them.

Cyclefree