Unofficial monster raving loonies. Decoding the Brexit customs union row

Unofficial monster raving loonies. Decoding the Brexit customs union row

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For a moment, let us contemplate the lower reaches of British politics and consider parties other than the big two.  Some of those political parties, like the DUP and the Women’s Equality Party, are best known for particular policies.  Some, like the Greens and the BNP, are best known for their values.

The Official Monster Raving Loony Party is best known for neither, being famous chiefly for in a minor way improving the gaiety of the nation.  Yet it has had notable policy successes in the past, being the first to advocate lowering the voting age to 18, the idea of passports for pets and all-day pub opening.  The two main parties will pilfer ideas from absolutely anyone.

The Loonies are fighting the Lewisham East by-election and have published their manicfesto online here.  At least three of their policy offerings could be rebadged by nominally saner parties: the idea of playgrounds for all ages; the idea of saving money by only painting yellow lines where you can park; and the idea that “All political and electoral leaflets will be printed on soft paper so that it may be recycled in the appropriate manner”.  They sound suspiciously sensible to me.  Less appealing to this voter, they are apparently advocates of compulsory voting.  The OMRLP are outriders for many of the bossier MPs on this subject.

The Loony ethos has permeated right to the top of government.  At present the Cabinet is riven by a split between those who advocate an agreement with the EU based on a customs partnership (which appears to be at present technically impossible and in any case has already been ruled out of hand by the EU as a basis for negotiation) and those who advocate an agreement with the EU based on “MaxFac” (which also appears to be at present technically impossible and has also already been ruled out of hand by the EU as a basis for negotiation). 

Now you might well regard the government as mediocre, filled with lazy ideologues, overpromoted lightweights and blinkered administrators.  I do.  But they are not obviously insane.  So what is going on? 

I have identified four possibilities.  First, despite the public statements made by EU negotiators, British politicians believe with no additional evidence that the EU will in practice be more flexible than indicated. 

Secondly, despite the public statements made by EU negotiators, British politicians have been given private indications that the EU will in practice be more flexible than indicated. 

Thirdly, British politicians do not believe that the EU will be more flexible and are having the argument as a proxy for a different argument. 

Fourthly, British politicians do not believe that the EU will be more flexible and are having the argument to buy (or sell) time. 

These possibilities are not mutually exclusive and different Conservative politicians may be operating on the basis of different rationales.  I don’t believe that anyone thinks the EU is ultimately going to buy either of these solutions.  But it certainly seems that some of the more extreme Leaver politicians are indeed anxious that Brexit is to be watered down too far for their red-toothed tastes and treating this battle as part of that broader fight.  They will be aware of the risk of a disruptive Brexit and regard that as a risk worth running in order to secure the degree of separation from the EU that they desire.  So they are baring their teeth on this.

Theresa May, on the other hand, will be calculating very differently.  Her pattern of behaviour since becoming Prime Minister has been consistent: to defer decisions until they make themselves.  So, for example, as late as September 2017, prominent Leavers were huffing and puffing about a Brexit bill of £40 billion.  Yet £40 billion is pretty much what was agreed in December 2017, when Leavers reluctantly accepted that was needed to get a deal struck.

In practice to date on the Brexit negotiations, that has meant caving in to the EU in time at each point, as that example demonstrates.  That means that Leavers are getting frustrated with the lack of macho confrontation.

On the question of customs, she is again running a slow bicycle race.  She does not want to be seen to be advocating a continued customs union, which is hugely unpopular with the hardliners.  Yet she needs to find a solution that enables Britain to act consistently with its Good Friday Agreement obligations, which requires far more integration on customs than many Leavers at present are countenancing.  So she is penelopising, seemingly working industriously to progress options that she secretly unravels later, looking to buy time until the ultimate decision is reluctantly accepted by all (or almost all).

But she cannot do this indefinitely.  If a deal is to be struck with the EU, it will need to be struck fairly soon – the clock is ticking down to 29 March 2019.  The crunch point is coming, which is no doubt why the government has announced that the Brexit Bills are coming back to Parliament again now.

What, assuming that a deal is reached, will the ultimate decision look like?  I suspect Theresa May is less concerned by that question than by getting there without leaving her government broken-backed.  (Seen in that light, we should not be surprised by reports that the Cabinet has never been briefed on the costs of MaxFac – the detail of the policy is irrelevant, so long as the possibility of the policy keeps the government from falling apart in the short term.)  But those of us less concerned about the future of the government than about the future of the country need to think about that question.

First, it probably won’t be called a customs union.  Theresa May has said that Britain will be leaving the customs union and so whatever the ultimate arrangement is, she won’t want it to be called that.  Secondly, it will need to be immediately workable.  That means that it is going to need to look quite like a customs union.

The government’s soft-line opponents seem confident that they can defeat it over the customs union question in the House of Commons.  If they are right to be confident, the government will know that too.  This begs the interesting question of whether Theresa May is consciously setting herself up for a Laevinic defeat.  (For those that are unfamiliar with this idea, it is the opposite of a Pyrrhic victory – a defeat that brings a reward greater than triumph would have secured.)  For if she is defeated on the floor of the House of Commons over the question of a customs union, she can seek to continue on that basis, respecting the will of Parliament over her own wishes, allying herself with the disgruntled hardline losers as she implements their strategic quietus.

There’s madness in this method, it seems.  The Loonies have taken over the asylum indeed.

Alastair Meeks


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